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Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Luxury: eBay's 
Liability for Contributory Trademark Infringement in 
the United States, Germany, and France 
Sofia H. Ahmea 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Tales of consumer woes abound after disgruntled eBay customers 
recognize they have been duped into purchasing counterfeit luxury 
items for too-good-to-be-true prices. Luxury goods trademark 
holders are likewise disgruntled about the proliferation of counterfeit 
versions of their products appearing on eBay. Despite customer 
complaints and protective trademark holders, eBay has gained a 
reputation as a haven for counterfeit goods. 1 
To protect the interests of customers and trademark holders, 
eBay must first consider the approach to trademark regulation 
adopted by a given jurisdiction. Secondary markets like eBay present 
a difficult regulatory challenge to which there is no obvious solution. 
One possible approach would be to require consumers to be more 
wary in their purchases and trademark owners to be more vigilant in 
their enforcement. Another approach would make the government 
or trademark owners-not eBay-responsible for all trademark 
enforcement. A third alternative would require eBay to bear the 
entire burden of trademark enforcement. Regardless of where the 
regulatory burden rests, more strict regulation of trademark 
infringements is imperative if eBay is to continue dealing in luxury 
goods. 
Recent court decisions in lawsuits against eBay filed in the 
United States, Germany, and France have yielded divergent results, 
leaving all involved uncertain of eBay's status as an international 
* J.D. candidate, University of La Verne College of Law (2010); M.A., Califilfllia 
Polytechnic University, Pomona (2007); B.A., Scripps College (2003). The author would like 
to thank Professors Diane KJein and Kevin Marshall ti,r their advice and guidance while 
researching and writing this Note. The author would also like to give special thanks to her 
parents, Riaz and Shaista Ahmed, and to her sisters, Alia, Hina, and Sana, t(lr all of their love 
and support. 
I. Sec Portero.com Ruyer~' Protection Plan Protects Consumers Where Law Doesn't, 
REllTERS, July IS, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/articie/pressRelease/idUS223801+15-ul-
2008 +PI,,-"l2 00807 I 5 (citing Prokssor Susan Scatidi). 
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dealer in luxury goods. 2 The courts in each of these countries arrived 
at different conclusions primarily based on the application and 
analysis of their respective trademark and anti-counterfeiting laws. 
Luxury goods makers consistently argue that eBay's efforts to curb 
the rising threat of counterfeiting are inadequate, as evidenced by the 
large number of counterfeit goods found on the site at any given 
time. eBay asserts in response that it employs numerous measures to 
combat counterfeiting, and that any more would in effect ban the 
sale of luxury goods on the site altogether. Thus, the underlying 
issue in all three cases is whether eBay's anti-counterfeiting measures 
have been sufficient. 
This Note will examine the judicial interpretations of trademark 
and anti-counterfeiting laws in France, Germany, and the United 
States, and the implications of these decisions on eBay and other 
online marketplaces. Ultimately, the approach taken by U.S. 
trademark law, embodied in the Lanham Act, seems to strike the 
most appropriate balance between eBay's interest in allowing loosely 
regulated sales and the customers' and trademark holders' interest in 
protecting themselves. The Lanham Act requires eBay to engage in 
self-monitoring, while also recognizing that trademark rights are 
private rights that are most-effectively enforced by the trademark 
owner. 
Part II of this Note discusses the manner in which the three 
jurisdictions approach trademark and counterfeiting issues. It then 
examines the historical context of each country's trademark and 
counterfeiting laws, as well as some of the rights and remedies 
available to trademark holders in each country. Part III looks at 
eBay, its operations as a global company, and its potential for usc as a 
platform for the sale of luxury goods, both real and counterfeit. This 
Part explores eBay's policies and mechanisms to fight the sale of 
counterfeit goods and discusses the sufIiciency of these policies. 
Parts IV through VI provide detailed explanations of cases 
against eBay in the United States, Germany, and France, respectively, 
with each lawsuit alleging that the site contributed to trademark 
infringement by facilitating the sale of counterfeit luxury goods. 
Specifically, Part IV analyzes the United States decision in Tiffany) 
Inc. v. eBay) Inc. and consider how the application of previous tests 
for contributory trademark infringement led a U.S. District Court to 
find in favor of eBay. Part V discusses a German lawsuit against eBay 
2. See infra Parts IV~VI. 
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that the German Federal Supreme Court remanded for further fact 
finding as to the sufficiency of eBay's anti-counterfeiting measures, 
although the court's opinion strongly suggests that eBay is indeed 
vicariously liablc.3 Part VI examines three French decisions that have 
held eBay grossly negligent for its inadequate anti-counterfeiting 
measures and have punished eBay by awarding signitlcant damages.4 
Lastly, Part VII considers what eBay can do, in light of these 
decisions, to adequately protect the rights of trademark holders and 
consumers without destroying its business model. 
II. TRADEMARK AND ANTI-COUNTERFEITING LAWS IN FRANCE, 
GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES 
Trademark and anti-counterfeiting laws vary from country to 
country, making it diHicult for an international online company such 
as eBay to adhere to the laws of every nation. This Part introduces 
and compares the relevant laws of three prominent nations-France, 
Germany, and the United States. 
A. France: Early Trademark Protection for Luxury Goods Makers 
France houses a number of the world's most recognized luxury 
brands, which its legal system aggressively and effectively protects. In 
1857, France established the tlrst truly comprehensive trademark 
system in the world.s Then in 1994, private sector anti-
counterfeiting efforts successfully influenced the passage of even 
more protective measures, giving customs authorities the power to 
seize counterfeit goods.6 Acting under this authority, French 
customs agents seized more than six million items in 2007.7 Today, a 
3. Rundesgerichtshof [RGH) [Federal Court of Justice) Apr. 19, 2007, 
Entschiedungen des Rundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [RGHZ] 1149 (F.R.G.). 
4. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eRay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.c.] 
[Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 2008; Christian Dior Couture v. eRay, Tribunal de 
Commerce de Paris [T.C.) [Commercial Court) Paris, June 30,2008; SA ParhllTIS Christian 
Dim v. cBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C.) [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 
2008. 
S. The IP Guide to France, II' REV. ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2006, 
http://www.cpagl(lbal.C<lln/ip-review-(1llIine/117S/the_ip_guide_to __ trance. 
6. Dimitra Kessenides, LVMH to eBay: Knock It Ofjl, AM. LAW., January II, 2007, 
al'ailable at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1168471808673. 
7. BENOIT RATISTEI.LI, THE FRENCH ANTl-COUNTERfEITlNC; POLICY INPI AND THE 
NATIONAL ANTI-COlJNTERHJTINC; COMMITTEE 2 (2008), available at 
http://w\\w.usibc.com/NR/rdonlyres/exw4e2ei4Ib.Ydasxdbohbaypleio7rnkzSdpSviS3kfclr46 
bamfzeymm6y66nh III 4 nykk 4 kc7u4 iggcnqtsxS euec7 d/Pn ltectingI P2 7th Battistelli. pd f 
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tourist arriving in France with a counterfeit handbag may be fined 
and the item may be confiscated.8 
French regulations established a broad system to protect luxury 
brand companies from counterfeiting. The 1994 legislation led to 
the creation of the Comite National Anti-Contrefa~on (CNAC), or 
the National Anti-Counterfeiting Committee.lJ The CNAC derives 
its authority from the Institut National de la Propriete Industrielle 
(INPI), the National Intellectual Property Otlice of France. lo The 
CNAC's primary task is to apprise the public of the "dangers" of 
counterfeiting, and to ensure public compliance with anti-
counterfeiting laws. The CNAC supports the activities of the Colbert 
Committee (an association of seventy French luxury goods makers) 
which include anti-counterfeiting education campaigns. I I A recent 
Colbert Committee poster campaign emphasized the legal 
consequences to those purchasing or possessing counterfeit goods. 12 
The poster featured visuals of luxury goods (such as Cartier watches, 
Louis Vuitton shoes, Christian Dior sunglasses, etc.) and read: "In 
France, buying or carrying a counterfeit product is a criminal offense 
punishable by up to 3 years imprisonment and a £300,000 fine. 
Counterfeiting is a real menace to society.,,13 Current French law, in 
addition to imposing fines and jail time, requires mandatory 
forfeiture of counterfeit goods. 14 Thus, trademark owners in France 
work in concert with the government to combat the proliferation of 
counterfeit goods at every level of the distribution chain, including 
the consumer level. 15 
8. Kessenides, supra note 6. 
9. Marie Le Bare, Nobody is Supposed to Ignore the Law!, LE MAGAZINE DE LA HAllTE 
HORLOC;ERlE, Sept. 18, 2007, http://journal.hautehorlogerie.org/ 
spip.php?page=article&id3tticle=4S40. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id.; Comite Colbert, New Anti-counterteiting Campaign, 
http://www.c()mitec()lbert.o)m/internet/index.php?()pti(>I1=c()11l_oHltent&task=view&id=23 
6&Itemid=221 &lang=en (last visited Aug. 21, 2009); see also Alessandra Galloni, RaJlgincq 
Fakers and Sellers-Makers of Luxury Goods Try NelV Le..qal Tactics against ,[71ose Who Aid 
Counterfeiters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31,2006, at Bl. 
14. See ORC;. fOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEY., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT Of 
COUNTERHJTlNG AND PIRACY 231 (2008). 
15. Seeid.at231-32. 
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B. Germany: Strong Trademark Protection with Initiative Required of 
Trademark Owners 
Following the establishment of French trademark law, Germany 
passed its first trademark act in 1894.16 A form of that act still exists 
today, but the addition in 1995 ofa standard method for registration 
changed many aspects of this law. 17 Today, Germany is one of the 
European Union's largest commercial markets. Germany's approach 
differs from France's approach in that it requires the trademark 
holder to take the 101tIative in investigating incidences of 
counterfeiting. IK Furthermore, the state only prosecutes infringers 
when the counterfeiting is clear and will affect the public interest. 1<) 
Nevertheless, German luxury good makers often seek preliminary 
injunctions to halt further distribution of infringing goods and to 
confiscate counterfeit merchandise.20 
In Germany, unlike other nations in the European Union, 
trademark owners may also seek protection under the German Act 
against Unfair Competition (UCA).21 For trademark holders to make 
a claim under the UCA they must show that the counterfeit goods 
are (1) offered for sale in Germany; and (2) "either create avoidable 
confusion in consumers' minds as to the product's origin, or exploit 
or damage the reputation of rights holders or of their genuine 
products.,,22 Additionally, trademark owners from Germany and 
France may obtain protection throughout the European Union by 
registering their marks under the Community Trademark 
Regulation.23 This directive has increased harmonization, but has left 
intra-national trademark law unaffected. 24 
16. 7iJe IP Guide to Germany, IP REV. ONLINE, Feb. 15, 2007, 
http://www.cpagl()bal.c<)m/ip-review-(>I1line/2331/the_ip_guide_to_germany. 
17. Id. 
18. Nils Weber & Katja Grabicnski, Anti-counterfeitinll Law and Practice in Germany, 
WORLD TRADEMARK REV., Mar./ Apr. 2008, at 60, available at 
http://\\'ww. \\'( )rld tradcmarkreview.c< )m/issues/ article .ashx? g=21 a49 3e 3 -7844-499 5 -9bde-
a25dab87b7ab. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Gesctz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb rUWGj [German Act against Untair 
Competition], July 3, 2004, RGRII at 1414. 
22. Weber & Grabicnski, supra note 18. 
23. Council Regulation 40/94, 1994 O.J. (L II) I, amended by Council Regulation 
422/2004 (EC). 
24. GEORl;!': A. RERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERlALS ON El7ROPEAN UNION LAW 
770 (2d ed. 2002). 
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C. The United States: Protection Focusing on Prevention of 
Counterfeiting 
Trademark law in the United States evolved somewhat differently 
than it did in France and Germany, struggling much in its early 
stages. The first U.S. trademark statute, the short lived Federal Trade 
Mark Act of 1870/5 collapsed in 1879 when the Supreme Court 
held that the act was unconstitutional because Congress had 
improperly relied on the Patent and Copyright Clause (Article 1, 
Section 8, Clause 8) to regulate trademarks. 26 Additionally, the 
Court held that the act was too broad to fit within Congress' powers 
under the Commerce Clause.27 In 1881, Congress passed new 
trademark legislation narrowly tailored to pass muster under its 
Commerce Clause powers. Congress substantially revised and 
broadened the 1881 act in 1905 as another major step in modern 
U.S. trademark regulation.2~ 
The next major development in U.S. trademark law occurred in 
1946 with the passing of the Lanham Act, which imposed civil 
penalties for trademark infringement.29 A few decades later, in 1984, 
Congress passed the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, a criminal 
trademark infringement statute punishing intentional traffickers of 
counterfeit goods or services. 30 Because the Lanham Act is the basis 
for the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, the Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act criminalizes only conduct prohibited by the 
Lanham Act-conduct defined as "traffick[ing],,31 or selling or 
trading counterfeit goods.32 Until recently, criminal liability did not 
exist under these statutes for producing or purchasing counterfeit 
items. In 2006, however, the United States enacted new legislation 
to combat the proliferation of counterfeit goods from Asia. 33 
25. PatentActofl870, Ch. 230,16 Stat. 198 (1870). 
26. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,93-94 (1879). 
27. Id. at 96-97. 
28. Robert G. Bone, Huntin<q Goodwill: A History Iff the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 578 n.162 (2006). 
29. Lanham Act, 15 U.S.c. §§ 1051-1141 (2008). 
30. 18 U.s.c. § 2320 (2008). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. Trafticking is detined as "trad[ingJ or deal[ing] in (goods, esp. illicit drugs, or 
other contraband)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1534 (8th ed. 2004). 
33. See Susan Krause, Le.Hislators Detail Concerns About Counterfeit Goods from China, 
BUREAU Of INT'L INfO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEl"T Of STi\TE, June 12, 2006, 
http://www.america.gov /st/washfile-english/2006/J une/20060612124226ASesuarKO. 
5563623.html. 
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Specifically, the Stop Counterfeiting in Manufactured Goods Act 
established new criminal laws dealing with actual counterfeiting.34 
The United States has taken a different approach than that of 
France and other nations by focusing its attention on preventing 
counterfeiting before it reaches the consumer. In this respect, 
American law goes further than French law by attempting to prevent 
trade in components that comprise a finished counterfeit good.35 
Individuals and companies are prohibited from trafficking in 
counterfeit "labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems, 
medallions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, 
documentation, or packaging of any type or nature" if those 
products are likely to cause confusion.36 On the other hand, U.S. law 
places no responsibility or liability on individuals who seek out (or 
inadvertently buy) counterfeit products; in fact, no criminal liability 
is incurred when purchasing counterfeit goods in the United States. 37 
As a result, trademark holders in the United States must still actively 
pursue counterfeiters through their own initiatives. 
The above-outlined differences in anti-counterfeiting laws 
between jurisdictions pose a challenge to a global company such as 
eBay in determining whether its anti-counterfeiting efforts are legally 
sufficient in all jurisdictions. Until various nations reach a consensus 
as to how best to protect trademark holders, international online 
marketplaces such as eBay may have no alternative other than to 
withdraw from the luxury goods market altogether, fight a losing 
battle, or bear a disproportionate enforcement burden without clear 
guidance. 
III. EBAY: How IT OPERATES AND ITS ANTI-COUNTERFEITING 
MEASURES 
eBay, located at www.ebay.com. allows users to buy and sell 
from one another.3x eBay calls itself "the World's Online 
Marketplace,,,3lJ and currently boasts 84.5 million active users.40 Its 
34. 18 U.s.c. § 2320 (2008). 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Galloni, supra note 13. 
38. See Brad Stone, Amid the Gloom, An E-Commerce War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,2008, 
atBUI. 
39. eBay, About d~ay, http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay.html (last visited Aug. 21, 
2009) [hereinafter About eBay j. 
40. Stone, supra note 38. 
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purpose is to "enabl[ e] trade on a local, national and international 
basis," and it features "a diverse and passionate community of 
individuals and small businesses, [through which] eBay offers an 
online platform where millions of items are traded each day. ,,41 eBay 
explicitly requires sellers to ensure that their goods do not infringe 
on the rights of others and expects intellectual property owners to 
monitor the site for infringing items. In addition, eBay provides 
"Guidelines for Creating Legally Compliant Listings," which explain 
that sellers must not list replicas or counterfeits for sale on its site.42 
eBay has two primary mechanisms to thwart the sale of 
counterfeit products: (1) the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) 
Program, and (2) a "fraud engine." VeRO is a notice-and-takedown 
system that allows intellectual property owners to report a listing 
with a potentially infringing item to eBay, which subsequently 
removes the listing.43 The fraud engine itself operates automatically 
and utilizes 13,000 different search rules designed to capture listings 
containing signs of counterfeit items. 44 These systems allow eBay to 
detect infringing products without requiring its own personnel to 
become experts in the brands or products of trademark owners sold 
on their site.45 
Despite these mechanisms, in 2006 eBay experienced a decline in 
active users coupled by a push by intellectual property owners such 
as Tiffany, Rolex, and LVHM to eliminate all infringing goods from 
the site.46 This push eventually led to lawsuits worldwide. 
Responding to the decline of active users, eBay introduced new 
measures to assure users that the site was sate for buyers to useY 
One of these new safety measures was the enactment of certain 
requirements for the categories listing most of the counterfeit goods. 
For example, sellers are limited in the number of auctions they may 
list under the "Clothing and Accessories" category, and the length of 
41. About eBay, supra note 39. 
42. See Brian W. Brokate, What's Nell' in Anticounterfeiting, 947 PLI/PAT 615, 639 
(2008). 
43. eBay, How eBay Protects Intellectual Property (VeRO), 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/tp/programs-vero-ov.html (last visited Aug. 21,2(09). 
44. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 20(8). 
45. Id. See also Keith Kupferschmid, No Silver Lininl! in Tif],any's Infi-in<qemcnt Case, 
INHlRMATION TODAY, Sept. 1, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.int()wday.com/it/ 
sep08/Kupferschmid.shtml. 
46. Brad Stone, eRay Reports Prl{qress against Fraud, INT'L HERALD TRIll., June 14, 
2007, at F1. 
47. Id. 
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the sale time is longer than for other categories. Requiring a longer 
sale period ensures that sellers cannot take the money and run48 and 
gives eBay a longer period of time to review the listings.4Y For 
Tiffany silver jewelry, for example, the minimum sale period is five 
days.50 Geographical restrictions offer further protection by banning 
sellers in China and Hong Kong from listing items in the categories 
most at1ected by luxury goods counterfeiting, such as 
"Accessories. ,,51 The adequacy of these efforts undertaken by eBay to 
tIght the sale of counterfeit goods on its site is at issue in all three 
cases reviewed below. 
IV. UNITED STATES: TIFFANY) INC. V. EEAY, INC. 
Among the many luxury brands that have taken issue with eBay, 
the jewelry giant Tiffany & Co. has waged a comprehensive anti-
counterfeiting legal battle against the online marketplace. Tiffany & 
Co., established in 1837, is a stationery and "fancy goods 
emporium."s2 Tiffany, well known for its luxury goods, is now one 
of the world's top jewelry companies.53 Since 2000, Tiffany's own 
retail stores, catalogs, website, and Corporate Sales Department have 
exclusively sold new Tiffany jewelry. 54 Tiffany does not explicitly 
authorize its merchandise for resale at online marketplaces, such as 
eBay, and does not sell its merchandise through liquidators or at 
discounted prices. 55 
Prior to 2003, Tiffany pursued legal action against individual 
eBay sellers of counterfeit Tiffany items, particularly sellers of 
counterfeit silver Tiffany jewelry. In that year, however, Tiffany 
transitioned from suing individual eBay sellers to suing eBay itself. 
Tiffany began the attack on eBay by asking the site to "(i) remove 
48. Id. 
49. KlIpterschlllid, Jupra note 45. 
50. Id. 
51. Stone, Jupra note 46. 
52. TifT:lny, History & Tillleiine, http://press.tiffany.colll/Localjcn-US/Doc/ 
History&Tilllelinc.pdf (last visited Aug. 21,2009). 
53. SUrJ":v: Harry WinJton 711p Luxury Jewelrv Brand, NAT'L JEWELER, Jan. 18,2007, 
http://www.nati(lIlaljeweiernct\\.(lrk.com/njn/c(lIltencdispiay/tJshion/e3i96ed72e4599t72 
9559d3tu85b J 9t2c40?inp=true; Rigel Celeste, The Top 10 Jewelry BrandJ (As Ranked by 
Wealthy COllJumcrJ), LllXIST, Feb. 9, 2008, http://www.lllxist.colll/2008/02/09/the-top-
10- jewel ry -bran ds-as- ranked -by-wealthy-c( lllSlllllers. 
54. Tiffany, Inc. v. eJhy, Inc., 576 F. SlIpp. 2d 463, 472-473 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing 
Michael Kowalski, President ,md CEO of Tiffany). 
!'i5. Id. at 473. 
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listings for all Tiffany counterfeit merchandise currently on the eBay 
website; and (ii) take appropriate and continuing measures to 
eliminate the sale of counterfeit merchandise through the eBay 
website in the future; and [( iii)] cease using any 'Tiffany' identifier to 
label counterfeit goods. ,,56 
According to Tiffany, eBay responded by encouraging Tiffany to 
utilize the VeRO program in combination with the efforts made by 
eBay to remove listings that contained obvious infringements. 07 
Tiffany replied a year later after conducting an illustrative survey in 
which they asserted that at least seventy-three percent of the sterling 
silver Tiffany merchandise on eBay was counterfeit and that only a 
definitive five percent was genuine.5x Based on the results of this 
survey, Tiffany demanded that eBay ban the sale of lots of five or 
more Tiffany non-silver jewelry items, ban the sale of Tiffany silver 
jewelry altogether (because most of it was counterfeit), and stop 
advertising the sale of Tiffany merchandise completely. 59 Tiffany 
subsequently sued eBay in New York federal district court.60 
In its complaint, Tiffany alleged that eBay was liable for 
contributory trademark infringement "by virtue of the assistance that 
it provides to, and the profits it derives from, individuals who sell 
Tiffany counterfeit goods on eBay.,,61 The issue of first impression in 
the case was whether an internet site such as eBay, which only acts as 
an intermediary in transactions, may be liable for contributory 
trademark infringement. 
The Lanham Act does not specifIcally address contributory 
trademark liability.62 However, the Supreme Court expressly 
recognized liability for contributory trademark infringement in the 
1982 case Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.rd After 
numerous pharmacists sold generic pills as brand name drugs, I ves 
Laboratories-manufacturer and distributor of the brand name 
prescription drug Cyclospasmol-sued for damages and for 
injunctive relief against companies which produced look-alike generic 
56. Id. at 481. 
57. Id. at 482. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
6l. Id. at 470. 
62. See Brian D. Kaiser, Contributory Trademark Injl-inBcment by Internet Service 
Providers: An Argument jor Limitation, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL'y 65, 86 (2002). 
63. 456 U.S. 844 (J982). 
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pills. 64 The District Court held that Inwood Laboratories and other 
generic drug manufacturers were only liable for trademark 
infringement if they encouraged the substitution, or if once they 
knew about the substitution, continued to distribute to the 
substituting pharmacists.65 Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the ruling of the District Court, holding that a party is vicariously 
liable for contributory trademark infringement only when that party 
actually encouraged or participated in the infringement.66 
The Supreme Court noted that contributory trademark 
infringement could arise in either of two ways. First, although not 
pertinent to the facts in Inwood) infringement may occur if one party 
purposefully induces another to infringe a trademark.67 Second, 
contributory infringement may attach to one who, as "a 
manufacturer or distributor ... continues to supply its product to 
one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark 
infringement."6H Because Inwood had no personal contact with 
pharmacists and there were only a few instances of pill substitution, 
the Court held that there was no reason for Inwood or other generic 
drug manufacturers to know of the pill substitutions.69 
When analyzing eBay in light of this second type of 
infringement, the issue in Tiffany was whether eBay knew or should 
have known about the infringements of Tiffany'S trademarks 
occurring on the site. eBay did not dispute that it possessed a general 
knowledge of the fact that some isolated items being sold on the site 
were counterfeit, especiaIly in light of Tiffany's Notice of Claimed 
Infringements (NOCls), its own fraud engine, and complaints from 
buyers about counterfeit Tiffany items sold on eBay?O Thus, the 
Court was forced to determine whether this "generalized 
knowledge" was sufficient to require atl-lrmative action by eBay to 
avoid contributory infringement liability.71 
eBay argued that generalized knowledge alone is insufficient to 
meet the knowledge requirement of Inwood's second contributory 
infringement category, asserting that not all Tiffany goods sold on 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 852. 
66. Id. 
67. Tifrany, Inc v. tRay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
68. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 854. 
69. Id. at 852~53. 
70. Tifl/my, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 508, 5 II. 
71. Id. at 508. 
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eBay are counterfeit.72 eBay argued that Inwood requires the third 
party to receive specific knowledge of the infringement, either 
independently or in the form of notice from the rights owner.73 eBay 
had a mechanism in place for specific notice-VeRO, which it 
encouraged Tiffany to utilize. 74 Nevertheless, Tiffany argued that 
eBay was "willfully blind" by not investigating or understanding the 
counterfeiting on its site.75 
The district court in Tiffany held that under Inwood, the "reason 
to know" standard may be met by demonstrating that the 
"defendant was willfully blind to the infringing activity. ,,76 To be 
willfully blind, "a person must suspect wrongdoing and deliberately 
fail to investigate.,,77 Willful blindness also requires "more than mere 
negligence or mistake";7K it requires that defendants keep themselves 
ignorant of suspicious behavior?'} Despite eBay's general knowledge 
of counterfeit goods selling on its site, however, the court found that 
eBay attempted to eliminate the problem through its fraud engine 
and VeRO. These efforts demonstrate that eBay did suspect 
wrongdoing and made efforts to investigate through technological 
and human measures, including dedicating employees to monitoring 
listings. so 
Ultimately, the court held that eBay was not liable for 
contributory trademark infringement.xl If the court had found eBay 
willfully blind under these circumstances, the decision would have 
transformed the "reason to know" standard into an afllrmative duty 
to fight against counterfeiting, even without specific knowledge. x2 
Furthermore, if generalized knowledge of infringement were 
sufllcient, Tiffany (and other trademark owners) could prevent 
owners who had previously purchased goods with no conditions on 
72. Id. at S09. 
73. Id. at S08. 
74. Id. at 478, SI4-IS. 
7S. Id.atSI3. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Kike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. SlIpp. 2d 1352, 1369-70 (S.D. 
Ga.2003) (cited in Tiff/my, 576 F. SlIpp. 2d at SIS). 
79. Tiff/my, S76 F. SlIpp. 2d at SIS; see Hard Rock Cate Licensing Corp. v. Concession 
Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1992). 
80. Tiffany, S76 F. SlIpp. 2d at 476-79. 
81. Id. at S27. 
82. Id.atS1S. 
258 
SPRING 2009 Life) Liberty and the Pursuit of Luxury 
their disposal or resale from reselling their items.x3 Owners of TifImy 
goods did not purchase those goods on the condition that they 
would not subsequently be able to resell the goods-such a 
restriction might have resulted in lower initial prices for the goods. 
Allowing Tiffany to exercise this power would run contrary to one of 
the purposes of trademark law embodied in the Lanham Act-to 
enable the public to purchase (and resell) goods with confidence,M 
not to enable trademark owners to exert complete and continued 
control over products carrying their marks. 
A business such as eBay has an economic incentive to ensure that 
users are happy with their goods, both because they receive a final 
value fee from each successful sale, and because mischaracterized 
goods require additional time and resources for resolving disputes 
and grievances. X5 Trademark rights are to some extent a public good, 
but commentators generally agree that they fundamentally represent 
the private rights of the trademark owner. H6 As a holder of a private 
right, a trademark owner bears personal responsibility for enforcing 
his right in the trademark. Xl Based on evidence presented by eBay, 
Tiffany spent few of its own resources in monitoring the eBay site to 
ensure that infringement was not occurring, but sought instead to 
pass that expense on to eBay. xx 
Tiffany's motives were also suspect. Had Tiffany been concerned 
only with counterfeit goods, it would not have suggested the five-
items-or-more rule as a blanket rule that applied to both new and 
old Tiffany goods.Xl) According to evidence presented by eBay, 
Tiffany's retail stores instituted a similar rule as an anti-diversion tool 
rather than an anti-counterfeiting tool. As such, the court reasoned 
83. Id. at 473. 
84. Joseph D. Garon, The Lanham Act: A LivinlJ ThinlJ, 7 FOR])HAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 55, 55-56 (1996). 
85. See eI~ay, About Our Buyer Protection Programs, http://pages.ebay.com/help/ 
buy/protection-programs.html#bpp (last visited Aug. 21,2009); eBay, What Does It Cost to 
Sell on eBay, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/questions/what-fees.html (last visited Aug. 
21,2009). 
86. See Katherine E. Gasparek, AP#vinlJ the Fair Use Defmse in Traditional Trademark 
InfrinlJement and Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tal{qinlJ or LinkinlJ Cases, 7 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 787, 795-96 (1999). 
87. Id. at 799. 
88. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 484-85. Limited resources were budgeted by Tiffany 
f()r combating the problem of online counterfeiting with only $763,000 budgeted in 2003. 
That amount represented only 0.05% of net sales in 2003 despite the "rampant" nature of 
counterfeit goods on eBay. 
89. Id. at 483. 
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that Tiffany was more concerned about the resale of authentic 
Tiffany goods purchased directly from their stores than they were 
about the sale of counterfeit items.YO For example, Tiffany has 
allowed a single buyer to buy twenty-five pieces at a time in its retail 
store.9 ! Tiffany's fixation with the fIve-items-or-more rule suggests 
that Tiffany was most concerned about remaining the exclusive 
provider of Tiffany goods.n However, as the Court identifIed in its 
opinion, no information was provided regarding "the actual size and 
scope of the legitimate secondary market in authentic Tiffany silver 
jewelry" that was at issue.93 Insofar as secondary markets are 
concerned, the Court further concluded, "eBay and other online 
market websites may properly promote and facilitate the growth of 
legitimate secondary markets in brand name goods. "Y4 
Under the rule enunciated in Tiffany, it is clear that for a party 
to be liable for contributory trademark infringement, there must be 
specifIc knowledge of trademark infringement, and in the face of 
such specific knowledge, the defendant must choose not to act. 
While eBay was generally aware of counterfeit TifFany goods on its 
site, it made efforts on its own and in cooperation with rights owners 
to eliminate the sale of counterfeit goods.9S In summary, the Tiffany 
court held that the knowledge requirement in contributory 
trademark infringement suits is not satisfIed by merely showing 
general knowledge of counterfeit goods sales or by a showing of 
simple negligence.96 
The approach to trademark law articulated in the Tiffany case is, 
to the great dismay of eBay, unique to the United States. In both 
Germany and France, as described below, no knowledge requirement 
exists. Therefore, in contrast to the Tiffany court's fInding, eBay may 
be held liable under tort theories of negligence and vicarious liability 
in those jurisdictions. 
v. GERMANY: ROLEX, INC. V. EBAY, INC. 
The decision in Rolex) Inc. v. eBay) Inc., implies that eBay's 
methods for tracking and eliminating counterfeit items are 
90. Id. 
9l. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 473. 
94. Id. 
95. See id. at 470. 
96. See id. at 515. 
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insufficient. The decision also suggests that an increased affirmative 
duty may be placed on eBay to monitor its listings. The result of the 
ruling could be to restrict sellers' ability to vend products at the price 
they determine, and to place an unreasonable burden on eBay. 
Montres Rolex S.A. (Rolex) was founded in London in 1905 as 
Wilsdorf and Davis. By 1919 the company moved to Geneva, 
Switzerland, and began doing business under its current name.'!l 
Rolex watches are known for their superb movement and hand 
craftsmanship.YX As a leading company in the luxury goods industry, 
its products are known as portable status symbols, just like Tiffany 
jewelry.'!') A typical Rolex watch costs over $7,000. 100 Rolex holds 
national and community trademarks in Germany and the European 
Union.101 Like Tiffany, Rolex grew concerned with the number of 
counterfeit products with the Rolex marks being sold on eBay, 
especially on eBay.de, the German site. 
A myriad of watches listed on eBay.de between June 7,2000 and 
January 25, 2001 were labeled "Rolex" or were embossed with its 
other trademarks such as the stylized crown.102 Some items were 
described as "Rolex-like" or "Rolex replica.,,103 In a cease-and-desist 
letter sent to eBay.de dated September 8, 2000,104 Rolex argued that 
the "very low reserve price in comparison to the list of the original 
watches was suHicient to give rise to a suspicion of a trademark 
infringement. ,,105 
eBay.de refused to comply with Rolex's request to cease the sale 
of counterfeit items bearing the Rolex names and marks. 
97. Hautehoriogerie.org, Rolex Story, http://www.hautehoriogerie.org/en/players/ 
brands/rolex/rolex.html (last visited Aug. 21,2009). 
98. Shelly Branch, Why Vintacqe Watches Sur,..qed 20% in the Past 18 Months, 
CNNMoNELC()M, May I, 1997, http://l11oney.cnIl.com/magazines/moIleymag/ 
moneyma~archive/1997 /05/01/225689/index.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2009). 
99. Id. 
100. Galt.com, Roiex Watches, http://www.galttech.com/research/tlshion/rolex-
watches.php. This is the average cost t<lr a brand new watch, but even an authorized seller, 
such as Essential Watches of Beveriy Hills, sells a coveted pre-owned model like the Explorer II 
t<lr thousands below retail. See, c.H., Essential Watches.com, Rolex Explorer II Circa 2000-
White Dial 16570, http://www.essential-watches.com/Rolex- Used-16570- Explorer-II-Circa-
2000-White-Dial-IOI64.aspx (last visited Aug. 21,2009). 
10 1. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH J [Federal Coun of JusticeJ Apr. 19, 2007, 
Entschicdungcn des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachcn [BGHZJ 1149 (F.R.G.). 
102. Id.at1150. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
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Consequently, Rolex sought injunctive relief from the courts. The 
cease-and-desist order sought by Rolex requested that cBay "cease 
and desist from marketing [items bearing the ROLEX Community 
trademarks] . .. when supplying watches. .. and using them or 
permitting them to be used [in internet auctions] ... if and insofar 
as the bid reveals that the goods offered arc not from the business 
owned by [RO LEX]. ,,106 Both lower courts refused to issue the 
order on the basis that an internet auctioneer, such as eBay, could 
not be held liable for trademark infringement by an auctioneer's 
offer. 107 Rolex appealed the decisions of the lower courts. lOX 
By applying for injunctive relief, Rolex forestalled eBay from 
claiming the "host provider privilege" under the EC Directive on 
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) because it does not apply to 
injunctive relief. 109 If eBay had been able to seek relief under the 
directive, it would have been shielded from liability. The EC 
Directive operates in a manner similar to the Inwood test in the 
United States, in that it requires specific knowledge of the 
infringement. liD The EC Directive holds that a provider is not liable 
if it did not have actual knowledge of the illegal behavior, or if it 
acted expeditiously to remove the information once it obtained such 
information. I I I 
The Bundesgerichtshof(German Federal Supreme Court) (BGH) 
remanded the case to the appellate court for further findings of fact, 
holding that a provider could be liable as a storer (disquieter) for 
obvious and clear infringements if the platform enables the offering 
106. Simon Chapman et a!., Has Time Run Out jilr Internet Auction Sites, Oct. 15, 
2007, http://www.ifu·.com/publications/ all/articles/has-time-run -()ut-ti)r-internet.aspx. 
107. Id. 
lOS. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice 1 Apr. 19, 2007, 
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1149 (1156) (F.R.G.), 2007 
E.T.M.R. 70; Chapman et a!., supra note 106. Under §§ Sand 11 of Act on the Utilization of 
Teleservices (Gesetz uber die Nutzung von Telediensten) (2001), an internet service provider 
such as eBay is not liable tt)r third-party content unless it has knowledge of such content and 
can be reasonably expected to block the use of such content. The BGH in its opinion, 
however, suggested that case law decided after the intermediate court decision dictates that the 
sections it relied on ti)r its decision do not apply to prohibitory injunctions. 
109. European Community Directive on Electronic Commerce (EC) No. 2000/31 of S 
June 2000 art. 14,2000 O.J. (L 17S) 1. "Host provider privilege," as defined in art. 14, § I, 
states that a service provider may not be held liable ti)r illegal content stored at the request of 
the recipient of the service on condition that (a) the provider does not have actual knowledge 
of the illegal activity or intimnation or (b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or 
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to enable access to the int'>rIllation. 
110. Id. 
Ill. Id. 
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of counterfeit productS. 112 Although the Community Trade Mark 
Regulation does not recognize liability for intermediaries, the BGH 
held that the provision on prohibitory injunctions, which had been 
left to individual member states to interpret, had to be supplemented 
to create liability for intermediaries. ll3 The court also applied Article 
11 of the European Enforcement Directive (Directive) .114 The 
Directive obliges Member States to ensure that in the case of 
intellectual property infringement, the holder of the rights may apply 
for an injunction "against intermediaries whose services are used by a 
third party to infringe an intellectual property right." 115 Recital 23 of 
the Directive states that the procedures for the injunctions are 
determined by the individual member states. I 16 
Under Article 14, § 3 of the EC Directive, the law of a member 
state controls and a member state may require a "service provider to 
terminate or prevent an infringement.,,117 If a member state's law 
requires a service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement 
by injunction, eBay has an afiirmative duty not to allow future 
infringement. eBay may comply by either having the appropriate 
means in place to prevent infringement or by not selling Rolex items 
at all. 
Because European Community law leaves open whether eBay 
may be liable as an intermediary for the actions of another, the court 
was free to apply German law. A stijrer or disquieter in German law is 
one who "knowingly participated in an infringing action.,,118 Under 
this type of liability, one must not be negligent or purposefully act, 
but one must willingly contribute to the action. 119 
The BGH reverted the case to the Appellate Court in Dusseldorf 
to determine whether eBay's existing preventive measures were 
112. Chapman et ai., sttpra note 106. 
113. Id.; sa Council Regulation 40/94, Community Trade Mark, art. 98, § 2, 1994 O.J. 
(L II) I; Bundesgerichtshof lBGHJ [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, 
Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1149 (1159) (F.R.G.). 
114. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (noting BGHZ 1149, (1159); Council Directive 
2004/48, Enf(Jrcement ofintellectual Property Rights, art. 11,2004 O.J. (L 157) 45, 76). 
liS. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (citing Bundesgerichtshof[BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice 1 Apr. 19,2007, Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachen [BGHZlI149 
(1159) (F.R.G.); Council Directive 2004/48, at 76). 
116. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (noting Council Directive 2004/48, at 54). 
117. Chapman et ai., supra note 106 (citing Council Directive 2000/31, Electronic 
Commerce, art. 14,2000 O.J. (L 178) I, 13). 
118. Gesetz tiber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [German Copyright Law] 
[UrhGl, § 97 I S.l. 
119. /d. 
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sufficient and, if not, what preventive measures may be considered as 
"technically possible and reasonable.,,120 The remand, however, did 
not clarify whether eBay acted knowingly in allowing infringement 
to occur on its site despite the measures it had in place (the fraud 
engine, VeRO, and manual searches by its employees). The decision 
by the German courts requires that eBay take all possible measures to 
avoid any infringements in the future. Arguably, if the facts of 
Tiffany are accurate, eBay has already been doing this.l2l Yet, by 
ruling as it did, the BGH implied that these measures are insufficient. 
Indeed, eBay must take additional precautions, limited to the extent 
that those precautions endanger eBay's business model. The cost of 
additional monitoring will likely dissuade eBay from allowing 
auctions of Rolex watches, thus ensuring that the listing does not 
infringe on Rolex's rights. 
The German court went further than simply remanding the issue 
of preventive measures. It also suggested that there ought to be 
triggering mechanisms, such as a starting price of less than €SOO 
(about $1000), that might obligate eBay to prevent infringement. 122 
However, such requirements may place unreasonable burdens on 
eBay and on customers wishing to sell or purchase Rolex watches. 
A triggering mechanism that requires a low starting price as 
conclusive evidence of infringement will require eBay to investigate 
based on general knowledge. It will also deny the right of legitimate 
Rolex owners to re-sell their items on eBay under the terms that they 
desire (which may also be very desirable to purchasers as well), 
without being provided notice when purchasing the watch, that they 
would be limited in any way in their ability to resell their item on the 
secondary market. Thus, the rule suggested by the BGH is overly 
extensive. 
VI. FRANCE: LVMH V. EBAY, INC. 
Enabling intellectual property owners to control the secondary 
market restricts the original purchaser's right to re-sell his or her 
items. Yet allowing the intellectual property owners the right to 
control the secondary market for their goods is precisely the result of 
120. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, 
Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshotes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 1149 (1160) (F.R.G.). 
121. See Tift'any, Inc. v. eEay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
122. Bundesgerichtshof [EGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, 
Entschiedungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZlI149 (F.R.G.). 
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the french decisions against eBay. Three cases by luxury goods 
producers against eBay in France illustrate how intellectual property 
owners are using trademark laws to hinder eBay's reasonable business 
activities and further unfair business practices against eBay consumers 
and sellers in france. 
Louis Vuitton Moet Hennessy (LVMH) was created in 1987 
when Bernard Amault merged storied luxury brands Louis Vuitton 
and Moet Hennessy.123 Throughout the 1990s, LVMH acquired 
additional luxury brands, including Thomas Pink, Chaumet jewelry, 
Fendi leather goods, the Pucci and Donna Karan fashion lines, Krug 
champagne, and TAG Heuer watches. 124 LVMH employs the "star 
brand" formula, which Arnault explains as "[s]harply defin[ing] the 
brand identity by mining the brand's history and find[ing] the right 
designer to express it, creat[ing] masterful marketing buzz, and 
tightly control[ling] quality and distribution.,,125 Sales of both 
counterfeit and legitimate LVMH goods on eBay destroy the efforts 
of LVMH to tightly control quality and distribution. In this effort, 
LVMH has investigated individual sellers and distributors of 
counterfeit goods and sued eBay and other internet service providers 
like Google. 126 
In 2006, LVMH filed three suits against eBay in the Tribunal de 
Commerce de Paris (France's Commercial Court), accusing eBay of 
listing counterfeit goods for sale on its site. 127 All three decisions 
were announced on June 30, 2008. I2S In the two non-fragrance-
related suits, LVMH alleged that since 1999, eBay has refused to 
take effective measures against counterfeiting by requiring sellers to 
123. Janet Guyon, The MaBic Touch, FORTUNE, Sep. 6, 2004, available at 
http:// m( mel' .cnn .C( )In/ magazin es/ti >rtLlI1e /f' >rtuncarchive /2004 /09 /06 /380345 /index. 
htm. 
124. Id. 
125. Slavin Marinovich, Louis Vuittlm, BRANnCHANNEL.COM, Nov. 13, 2006, 
http://www.brandchannel.com/features_profile.asp?pcid=31 O. 
126. Id. LVMH employs a dedicated staff to deal with anti-counterfeiting eff,>rts and 
employs other agents, investigators, and lawyers to investigate and prosecute counterfeiting. 
Similar to what has been done in the entertainment industry, LVMH is trying to educate the 
public about the counterteiting problem. 
127. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier v. eBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C] 
[Commercial Court 1 Paris, June 30, 2008; Christian Dior Couture v. eBay, Tribunal de 
Commerce de Paris [T.Cl [CommCfcial Court] Paris, June 30,2008; SA Parnlms Christian 
Dim ,'. eBay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C] [Commercial Court] Paris, June 30, 
2008. 
128. However, the case involving the LVMH group's fragrance brands utilized a different 
legal theory than the other two cases and will be discussed separately. 
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ensure the authenticity of goods or to otherwise close the account of 
a seller as soon as it was found to sell counterfeits. J2<I LVMH also 
argued that eBay's new technological measures in 2006 aimed at 
preventing the sale of counterfeit goods proved its past negligence in 
failing to more proactively prevent the sale of infringing goods on its 
site. 130 LVMH alleged in its complaint that of 300,000 Dior-branded 
items and 150,000 Louis Vuitton bags ottered on eBay during the 
first six months of 2006, 90% were counterfeit. 131 The Tribunal de 
Commerce found eBay liable for the damage under a negligence 
theory, determining that like the German court in Rolex, eBay had 
not taken sufficient measures to prevent transactions involving 
infringing items on its site. 132 
Once again, eBay argued that it was a mere host and as such 
could not be held liable under Article 6 of the Act on ConfIdence in 
the Digital Economy-an act which protects businesses that provide 
host services. 133 The Commercial Court dismissed eBay's argument 
and applying the analysis of the court in Tiffany, held that eBay was 
not merely passively involved in the transactions that occurred on its 
site, but should be considered a broker. The court believed that 
eBay's provision of marketing tools to sellers with information on 
brands, eBay's ability to create virtual stores, and eBay's ability to 
become a PowerSeller were sufficient to consider it a broker. 134 eBay 
acted as it did to earn the commission (listing fees and final value 
fees), and could thus be considered an intermediary. These actions 
were also the actions that the Tiffany court cited in determining that 
eBay had sufficient control to be considered more than a mere host, 
and thus could in principle be found liable for contributory 
trademark infringement. 135 
As in Tiffany and Rolex, LVMH alleged that eBay failed to 
129. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.C. Paris at 
7 A. 
130. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at 
7 A. 
131. Brokate, supra note 42, at 628. 
132. SA Louis Vuittoll Malletier, T.e. Paris at 12 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris 
at 12 A. 
133. Amdie Blocman, Constitutional Council Publishes its Decision on the Act on 
Confidence in the Digital Economy, July 10, 2004, http://merlin.obs.we.int/ 
sh< )w. php?t()rmat~pdt&iris_r~2004%207%20 18. 
134. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 11 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at 
12 A. 
135. Tiftanv, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 506-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2(08). 
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remove listings of known intellectual property infringers or to close 
accounts of repeat offenders. 136 The Tribunal de Commerce 
considered eBay's preventative measures in 2006 as efforts to 
mitigate the effects of its past negligence. 137 eBay's apparent 
knowledge of improper activity was sufficient to satisty the court that 
eBay was negligent in taking adequate measure to combat the 
problem.13x The Tribunal fined eBay a staggering €38.6 million 
(almost $54 million) for financial and reputational damage in the 
three cases, and imposed daily fines for eBay's failure to remove 
listings and advertisements containing LVMH goods. 139 
The court emphasized that counterfeiting is the "scourge of the 
legal economy," and that eBay's inaction is what perpetuates the 
position of LVMH as a victim of counterfeiting. 140 The fact that eBay 
removes infringing listings, and has a mechanism in place for doing 
so in VeRO, did not refrain the court from finding eBay negligent, 
nor did the fact that LVMH elected to not participate in VeRO to 
monitor eBay and to prevent infringement. 141 The court found eBay 
grossly negligent, thus imposing a strict duty on eBay to prevent the 
sale of infringing goods on its site. 142 Practically speaking, requiring 
eBay to establish additional measures to combat infringement simply 
makes it more cost-prohibitive to allow the sale of luxury goods on 
the site at all. 
The LVHM case affects items legitimately sold on the secondary 
market as seen in the third of the three French cases, the Parfurns 
case. Christian Dior, Kenzo, Guerlain and Givenchy are LVMH 
136. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at 
7 A. 
137. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at 
7 A. 
138. SA Louis Vuittlm Malletier, T.e. Paris at 7 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at 
7 A. 
139. SA LouiJ Vuittlm Malletier, Te. Paris at 17 A-18 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.C. 
Paris at 17 A-IS A; SA PartLIITIS Christian Dior v. tBay, Tribunal de COITIITItrct de Paris 
[T.e.] [Commercial Court] Paris I A, 18A-19 A (Junt 30, 2008) translated in 
http://kgalpad.bl()gs.t()rtllne.cnn.(()1TI/2008/10/08/tBay-rulings-rdating-t()-
«) un te rtC i ti n g -en gl i sh -tran sl a ti () n s /. 
140. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 9 A; Christian Dior Couture, Te. Paris at 
9A. 
141. SA Louis VuittlJ11 Malletier, Te. Paris at 12 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at 
12 A. 
142. SA Louis Vuitton Malletier, T.e. Paris at 12 A; Christian Dior Couture, T.e. Paris at 
12 A. 
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perfume brands. 143 Perfume companies requested that the 
government fine eBay 000,000 per day to prevent distribution of 
LVMH brand perfume advertisements, and that eBay also be flned 
for allowing perfume listings originating in France or allowing buyers 
in France to bid on the listing. 144 The perfume companies prevailed, 
receiving separate damages of €3.2 million as well as injunctions. 145 
In defending against the claims in the Parfums case, eBay argued 
that the VeRO program and other anti-counterfeiting measures 
protected the plaintitl's intellectual property rights to the best of 
eBay's ability.146 In France, goods are marketed in approved physical 
points of sale that are part of a framework of a selective distribution 
network. 147 A selective distribution network is a system in which a 
supplier or in this case, a manufacturer such as LVMH, agrees to 
supply products to approved distributors, and the distributors agree 
to sell to only end users or distributors within the network. 14M Article 
81 (1) of the Treaty that established the European Community 
prohibited all agreements and concerted practices that might have an 
effect on trade between the Member States and are designed to 
"prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common 
market." 149 However, an exemption is available under Article 81 (3) 
for vertical agreements for the supply of goods and services, 
irrespective of whether the goods or services are supplied for resale 
or for use. ISO Selective distribution networks are therefore permitted 
under this exception to European Community Regulation (EC) 
2790j1999. 1s1A further requirement for the exemption is that the 
supplier must fall below a market-share cap. 
The market-share cap requirement is of particular relevance in 
the Parfums case. Article 3( 1) of the Regulation limits the 
exemption to suppliers whose "market share . . . does not exceed 
30% of the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or 
143. LVMH, Pernunes and Cosmetics, http://w\\.w.lvmh.com/. 
144. SA Parfums Christian Dior, T.c. Paris at 2-3 A. 
145. Id.§4A. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. § I A. 
148. Practical Law Company, Selective Distribution, http://corporate.practicallaw.com/ 
8-107-7235. 
149. Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 81(3) 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
ISO. Id. 
151. Commission Regulation 2790/1999, On the Application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21. 
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services. ,,1,,2 eBay argued that LVMH's selective distribution network 
for perfumes did not qualify, indicating that LVMH possessed only 
23.9% of the selective distribution perfume market. 153 However, this 
percentage did not account for LVHM's market shares in the 
cosmetics market or market shares of sister companies under the 
LVMH umbrella. ls4 eBay argued that before a fine could be 
implemented for its failure to stop listings and sales of LVMH 
perfumes on eBay.tr, a hearing should be held before the 
Competition Council to determine whether the selective distribution 
network for LVMH was in violation of Article 81 (1).155 
Instead of ordering further fact-flnding on the LVMH selective 
distribution network, the court addressed the manner in which sites 
such as eBay undermine and victimize selective distribution 
networks. I"6 The court failed to consider the possibility that the 
selective distribution network might facially meet the criteria for an 
exception but still frustrate the purpose of Article 81 (1 )-promotion 
of competition between the Member States. 
The injunction granted in the Parfums case far exceeds 
protecting the selective distribution network. By making it 
impossible to list LVMH perfumes on eBay.tr or to purchase such 
perfumes when listed in other countries, the injunction is now 
effectively restricting even legitimate sales of the perfumes on the 
secondary market. 
Such an injunction directly contradicts the "first sale" doctrine 
under U.S. law. This doctrine provides that a trademark owner has 
no right to control the distribution of its trademarked product after 
its flrst sale (with certain exceptions such as contracting for that 
right).157 Under this doctrine, resale of a trademarked item by the 
original purchaser is neither trademark infringement nor unfair 
competition.ls~ The flrst sale doctrine is designed to (1) allocate the 
152. EC Treaty, supra note 148. 
IS3. SA ParhlITIS Christian Dior v. eRay, Tribunal de Commerce de Paris [T.C.] 
l Commercial Court] Paris, June 30,2008 at 5 A. 
154. Id. § 6A. 
15S. Id. 
IS6. Id. 
157. Prestol1cttes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359,368 (1924). 
158. Sebastian Intern., Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 r.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 
1995). For cases where U.S. courts have applied the doctrine, see, e.g., NEC Electronics v. 
CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1987); Matrix Essentials v. Emporium 
Drug Mart, 988 F.2d 587, 593 (5th Cir.1993); H.L. Hayden Co. v. Siemens Medical Sys., 
879 F.2d 1005, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989). The doctrine's premise also finds expression in the 
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brand identification benefIts to the manufacturer, and (2) to assure 
the consumer that he is receiving a genuine version of the product. 159 
However, at the same time the doctrine limits the manufacturer's 
control over the product by creating terminating that control after 
the first sale. 160 Secondary sales on eBay fall within this doctrine 
because the doctrine protects eBay buyers seeking discounts from 
secondary owners. 
The first sale doctrine exists within European Union law as well. 
However, the applicable regulations in the European Union allow 
only for community-wide exhaustion; the doctrine does not apply to 
trademarked goods that the maker places on the market outside of 
the community.161 Still, given that the first sale doctrine does exist in 
some form in all three jurisdictions, it lends credence to eBay's 
allegation that the actions of the luxury goods makers are nothing 
more than a means to prevent competition. In a press release after 
the French decisions, eBay declared that the decisions had nothing 
to do with counterfeits but rather were an "attempt by LVMH to 
protect uncompetitive commercial practices at the expense of 
consumer choice and the livelihood of law-abiding sellers that eBay 
empowers every day.,,162 eBay further argued that the French 
decisions deny consumers the basic market freedom to determine 
from whom they buy their goods. 163 
VII. WHO SHOULD BEAR THE EXPENSE? 
Generally, luxury goods makers in France, under the umbrella 
groups of the Comite Colbert and CNAC, cooperate with each 
other and with the government to combat counterfeits by punishing 
offenders and educating the public. 1M Conversely, some luxury 
goods makers, such as LVMH, think that eBay should bear complete 
responsibility for monitoring its own site. It is true that eBay profits 
Restatement (Third) ofUntair Competition § 24 cmt. b (1995): "IT]rademark owner cannot 
ordinarily prevent or control the sale of goods bearing the mark once the owner has permitted 
those goods to enter commerce." 
159. Sebastian Intern., Inc, 53 F.3d at 1075. 
160. Id. 
161. Council Directive 89/104/EEC, First Directive to Approximate the Laws of the 
Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) I; Community Trade Mark 
Regulation [EC] No. 40/94 of20 Jan. 1994, 1994 O.J. (L 11) l. 
162. eBaylnk, eBay Vows to Fight Following Overreach by LVMH, 
http://eBayinkblog.C<lln/2008/06/30/eBay-v()\\'s-to-tight-t()1l()wing-()I'erreach-by-Ivmh/. 
163. Id. 
164. Le Berre, supra note 9; Comite Colbert, supra note 13. 
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from the sale of goods on its site, but it also makes efforts through 
VeRO and its other programs to fight counterfeiting. 165 No one is in 
a better position than Tiffany to be able to identifY an original 
Tiffany product from a counterfeit, yet Tiffany will only authenticate 
a product if it is shown to be purchased from a Tiffany store, which 
would actually remove the need for authentication. 166 Even when a 
maker such as Tiffany authenticates a good on eBay, it can only 
accurately determine if a good is genuine seventy-eight percent of 
the time~ 167 How could eBay, which sells hundreds of thousands of 
different brands on a daily basis, be expected to authenticate all the 
brands and their marks, when the mark holders themselves cannot 
identifY their own mark a hundred percent of the time? The Lanham 
Act strikes an appropriate balance and ensures protection for 
trademarks. The Act provides information to consumers while 
recognizing that a trademark is a private right that requires the 
holder to be ultimately responsible. 168 
Buyers on eBay could also take more responsibility for the 
counterfeits they find on the site. Like other national sites, eBay.fr 
has a page that details how it protects intellectual property rights. 169 
On the bottom of each listing, there is a link entitled signaler cet 
objet, "to announce this item.,,17o By clicking on this button, one can 
report an item directly to eBay.fr for intellectual property rights 
infringement. The infringement could be because of a prohibition on 
selling the item on the site, or for infringing the copyright or 
trademark of another. l7l By allowing consumer reporting, eBay.fr 
allows its customers to participate in combating counterfeit goods. 
Although the level of motivation to report differs for individuals in 
France where the purchase of counterfeit goods is a crime, the same 
system may work worldwide.172 Even ordinary consumers will often 
know the general value of items they want to purchase. If they see a 
bargain that is too good to be true or an item that looks suspicious, 
they can report it to eBay for further investigation. Also, by allowing 
165. What Does It Cost to Sell on eRay, supra note 85; How eRay Protects Intellectual 
Property, supra note 43. 
166. Tiffany, InL v. eRay, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 463, 517 n.39 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
167. Sec id. at 482. 
168. Garon, supra note 84, at 56; see Gasparek, supra note 86, at 799. 
169. eRay.tr, Imp:! /www.eRay.tr. 
170. ld. 
171. eRay.tr, Aide eRay: Nous Contacter, http://pages.eRay.fr/help/contaccus/ _basel 
index_ 4.html?tierO=reporc listing.js&item= 140289067588 (last visited Aug. 21,2009). 
172. Le Rerre, mpra note 9. 
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consumers to report, they become more aware of the procedures that 
eBay has in place to fight counterfeiting, thereby rebuilding 
confidence in the authenticity of eBay goods. Involving consumers 
and trademark holders is one way to preserve the secondary market 
for luxury goods on eBay and prevent trademark infringement. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Over the past two years, eBay has received diametrical litigation 
outcomes in Europe and at home. European and American courts 
fundamentally disagree about the legal sufficiency of eBay's anti-
counterfeiting efforts. The European decisions ultimately threaten to 
destroy eBay's business model, while the American result leaves 
consumers with little recourse against fly-by-night sellers. While 
reducing the trade of counterfeit goods is an admirable goal, it 
should not come at the cost of legitimate owners' ability to sell an 
unwanted product. eBay can only continue to be a viable secondary 
market for luxury goods by taking a multi-pronged approach: 
continue to independently police the eBay sites, cooperate with 
intellectual property holders, and encourage consumers to be 
proactive in stopping the sale of counterfeit goods through a revived 
ethic of caveat emptor. 
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